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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Peanut-themed parks,1 barista training,2 and cash donations supporting 
environmental causes3 might seem unrelated to the casual observer.  In fact, 
these endeavors represent a global effort by corporations to increase their 
charitable giving and undertake socially responsible behavior that benefits 
their employees, consumers, and communities.  At a time when popular 
movements rage “against greed, corporate influence, gross social inequality 
and other nasty byproducts of wayward capitalism,”4 corporate social 
responsibility initiatives are particularly relevant because they represent the 
nexus between corporate action, government regulation, and the welfare of 
individual citizens.   
Popular distaste for corporations is not a new phenomenon. 
Contemporary scholars have addressed perceived problems with corporate 
misbehavior since the 1970s.5  As corporations continue to grow ever larger 
and acquire more global influence, the actions they take have the potential to 
affect individuals, environments, and states around the globe. 
American and Chinese companies are arguably the most influential in the 
world.  The United States and China are the world’s two largest economies,6 
and China is the United States’ second largest, and most important non-
North American, trade partner.7  In 2009, “U.S. goods and services trade 
with China totaled $390 billion.”8  The following year, the total goods trade 
between China and the U.S. was $457 billion.9  Given the enormity of the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Lisa W. Foderaro, Offbeat Corporate Giving: A Park Inspired by Peanuts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 2011, at A25. 
 2 Julie Jargon, Starbucks Pushes to Create Jobs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2011, at B6. 
 3 Adam Najberg, Alibaba’s Jack Ma Says He’s Misunderstood, CHINA REAL TIME REPORT 
(Oct. 20, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/10/20/alibabas-jack-ma-sa 
ys-hes-misunderstood/. 
 4 Ginia Bellafante, Gunning for Wall Street, With Faulty Aim, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, 
at MB1. 
 5 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at SM17. 
 6 Gross Domestic Product 2010, WORLD TIMES, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATA 
STATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf. 
 7 Top Ten Countries with Which the U.S. Trades: For the Month of August 2011, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2011/08/balance.html (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2013); The World Factbook: China, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Aug. 19, 
2013). 
 8 The People’s Republic of China, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2013). 
 9 Id. 
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economic partnership between the United States and China, the approaches 
the two countries take towards implementing corporate social responsibility 
will undoubtedly have global effects.  Therefore, it is important to develop a 
keen understanding of their respective approaches to Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and the implications their implementation methods 
have for corporations that conduct business worldwide and touch the lives of 
billions of people. 
The differing approaches to corporate social responsibility seen in the 
People’s Republic of China and the United States demonstrate the strengths 
and weaknesses of CSR.  A comparative study examining the social and 
legal history of CSR initiatives in both China and the United States will shed 
light on the different approaches and reveal a more effective model for the 
future. 
This Note addresses the origins and history of CSR, compares the modern 
approaches to CSR which China and the United States have taken, and 
discusses the benefits of adopting a voluntary model of CSR in the future.  
Although dissatisfaction with corporate activity is not a new occurrence, 
neither the piecemeal American approach nor the top-down Chinese 
approach seems to have resulted in more socially responsible corporations.  
Therefore, this Note argues that government-instituted CSR, both legislative 
and regulatory, is ineffective and should be discontinued.  Instead, 
corporations should be at liberty to choose whether or not to engage in 
socially responsible behavior as part of their general business plan.   
Part II of this Note presents a general overview of the history and 
development of CSR, its origins, and the objectives it was intended to 
achieve.  Part III describes CSR efforts in China.  This Note takes a holistic 
perspective in exploring not only the legal foundation of CSR, but also the 
historical and social underpinnings for CSR as well.  Part IV mirrors Part III 
in discussing the evolution of CSR in the United States, including legal 
initiatives and the socio-historic and philosophical bases for CSR.  Part V 
draws a comparison between the two countries’ respective approaches to 
CSR and offers an analysis of effective CSR implementation efforts in each.  
Part VI applies the inferences drawn in Part V to current and future CSR 
initiatives and expands on the argument for minimizing government 
involvement in CSR and the advancement of corporate freedom.  Finally, 
Part VII concludes this Note. 
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II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: ORIGINS 
AND GOALS 
The most basic legal issue underlying CSR is whether corporate directors 
owe a legal duty to take into consideration the effects of their decisions only 
on shareholders or on all stakeholders affected by the corporations’ actions.10  
General principles of corporate social responsibility have been in existence 
for as long as businesses have operated.11  In the West, “[t]he bonds of trust 
and principles of good faith and fair dealing used by medieval merchants, 
guilds, and bodies corporate in the medieval lex mercatoria (“law of 
merchant”) reflected that cooperative and beneficial public purpose and 
sense of mutual responsibility.”12  Principles of corporate social 
responsibility were also a fundamental part of business practice in colonial 
America: 
Public purposes certainly characterized the companies 
chartered by the early American states . . . .  [T]he state 
generally reserved to itself the power to determine what kinds 
of entity it would permit to come into existence, vetting both 
the identity of the promoters and the nature of the venture.  
Corporate social responsibility was thus encoded into the DNA 
of the firm, since the firm could not come into existence unless 
it could withstand a valid public purpose test.13   
The extreme and more contemporary rule asserting the concept of 
shareholder primacy was set forth in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.14  There, the 
court endorsed the view that corporations are run solely for the benefit of 
shareholders: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily 
for the profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors 
are to be employed for that end.  The discretion of directors is 
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and 
                                                                                                                   
 10 C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical 
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002). 
 11 Joe W. Pitts III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 334, 343 (2009) (“Today’s corporations derive from ancient 
predecessors and have a long pedigree as instruments for collective social purpose, with CSR 
‘in their DNA.’ ”). 
 12 Id. at 344. 
 13 Id. 
 14 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
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does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of 
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders 
in order to devote them to other purposes.15   
In its rejection of stakeholder benefit trumping maximization of profit, 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. represents the “high (or low!) water mark of 
[corporate social responsibility] doctrine.”16  In fact, “[a]side from Dodge, 
there are no other cases that ‘actually operationalize the rule that 
corporations must maximize profits.’ ”17 Thus, Dodge stands alone in its 
position that corporate activity should be undertaken to benefit stakeholders. 
In the years following the Dodge decision, legal scholars fiercely debated 
the issues it addressed.18  One of the earliest concise definitions of what is 
now known as corporate social responsibility was articulated during this era 
when Professor E. Merrick Dodd wrote, “those who manage our business 
corporations should concern themselves with the interests of employees, 
consumers, and the general public, as well as of the stockholders.”19 
The intellectual tug-of-war between the proponents of shareholder and 
stakeholder-primacy models did not end in the first half of the twentieth 
century, however.  In the latter half of the century, Professor Milton 
Friedman rejected the developing CSR doctrine set forth by Professor Dodd 
and his intellectual descendants, instead advocating for a shareholder-
primacy approach that elevated corporate profits above charitable giving and 
other activities deemed incompatible with profitmaking.20  Disdaining the 
CSR initiatives he conceptualized as “window-dressing,” Professor Friedman 
further argued that “ ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase 
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.’ ”21  
                                                                                                                   
 15 Id. at 684. 
 16 MICHAEL KERR, RICHARD JANDA & CHIP PITTS, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 62 (Chip Pitts ed., 2009). 
 17 Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the 
Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 643 n.70 (2009) (quoting Jonathan Macey, A 
Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 180 
(2008)). 
 18 Compare Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049 (1931) (arguing that corporate managers owe a fiduciary duty exclusively to the benefit 
of shareholders), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (arguing that a broader characterization of corporate duty 
should include other stakeholders). 
 19 Dodd, supra note 18, at 1156. 
 20 Friedman, supra note 5. 
 21 Id. 
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Present day proponents of Professor Friedman’s theories similarly 
characterize CSR efforts as little more than good advertising.22 
On the other end of the ideological spectrum, Professor R. Edward 
Freeman advocated for a “strategic management” model that incorporated 
CSR principles into a comprehensive stakeholder-centric corporate 
governance scheme.23  Ethical considerations, he argued, are central to a 
corporate strategy that embraces corporate social responsibility.24  Professor 
Freeman’s portrayal of corporations as moral entities who must take their 
ethical responsibilities seriously is not obscure.  His perspective is consistent 
with those of other scholars, who argue that “as actors in this world with both 
positive and negative impacts, corporations are best seen not as inherently 
immoral or moral but as collections of human beings who act together as 
agents with moral consequences—for good or ill.”25  Corporate social 
responsibility therefore exceeds standard laws and regulations and appeals to 
a more fundamental idea of right and wrong in the context of corporate 
behavior.26 
On a global scale, more recent CSR initiatives have been characterized as 
a response to the “trade liberalization era of the 1990s,” when world-wide 
corporate activity became more commonplace due to tremendous advances 
in technology.27  Moreover, modern CSR represents the confluence of 
voluntary corporate efforts and the broader, governmental and 
supragovernmental regulatory schemes.28  Indeed, the nexus between public 
and private action leaves open to debate whether even voluntary CSR efforts 
are truly voluntary or just a response to government action.29  Some scholars 
have observed that “although state policies stand as constraints on 
supragovernmental ones, they work more as influences than as controls.”30   
                                                                                                                   
 22 Andrew C. Coors & Wayne Winegarden, Corporate Social Responsibility—Or Good 
Advertising?, REGULATION, Spring 2005, at 10, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulati 
on/regv28n1/v28n1-noted.pdf. 
 23 R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 246–47 
(1984). 
 24 R. EDWARD FREEMAN & DANIEL R. GILBERT, JR., CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE SEARCH 
FOR ETHICS 174–75 (1988). 
 25 KERR, JANDA & PITTS, supra note 16, at 40–41. 
 26 Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural 
Change?, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 64, 64 (2010) (“[CSR] suggests that companies should do 
more than they are obligated under applicable laws . . . .”); see also FREEMAN & GILBERT, 
supra note 24, at 5 (“Ethics and business go together.”). 
 27 Pitts, supra note 11, at 357. 
 28 Id. at 359. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It Be 
Democratic?, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 513, 528 (2008). 
2013] THE BUSINESS OF BUSINESS  753 
 
 
Lastly, modern CSR is seen as a response to “unbridled [corporate] 
control [that] was exacerbating social inequalities and human rights 
violations while endangering the earth’s ecological systems and depleting 
natural resources.”31  CSR’s goals, therefore, are the betterment of mankind, 
society, and the environment in order to achieve a more peaceful world.32 
III.  CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA 
A.  Legislative Action 
1.  Legislation 
On January 1, 2006 the most recent version of China’s Company Law 
became effective.33  This major piece of legislation provided the foundation 
for China’s “strong and mandatory, compliance and impact-oriented public 
action” implementation of corporate social responsibility.34  Its text, which 
mandates that companies “shall comply with the laws and administrative 
regulations, social morality and business morality” and “shall act in good 
faith, accept the supervision of the government and the general public, and 
bear social responsibilities,”35 codifies the obligation of businesses 
nationwide to observe the basic principles of CSR and provides a legal basis 
for corporate social responsibility in China.   
The law is the product of much deliberation among both Chinese legal 
scholars and the National People’s Congress delegates who drafted the 
revision.36  As an amalgamation of views, Article 5 is subject to multiple 
interpretations.37  The predominant view is that Article 5 functions not as a 
fiat but as an exhortation.38  Alternatively, some scholars argue that corporate 
                                                                                                                   
 31 Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational 
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 51 (2010). 
 32 See Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure 
Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591, 
611–12 (2008) (providing definitions used by various governments and NGOs for the term 
“corporate social responsibility”). 
 33 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Chinese Company 
Law], available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=50878. 
 34 Joëlle Brohier-Meuter, The Rise of CSR Public Policy in Asia: The Case of Southeast 
Asia and China, in RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: PERSPECTIVES ON CSR 65, 84 
(Geoffrey Williams ed., 2011). 
 35 Chinese Company Law, supra note 33, art. 5 (emphasis added). 
 36 Lin, supra note 26, at 70–71. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 96. 
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social responsibility is “part of [a business’s] fiduciary duties under the 
company law.”39  In either case, the law unequivocally makes the Chinese 
government a strong actor in the realm of corporate social responsibility. 
In addition to differing perspectives on the actual effect of Article 5, a 
pertinent background issue is the acknowledged shortcomings of the 
developing Chinese legal system.40  While corporate social responsibility has 
technically been enacted, the “ambiguity and unpredictability in rules and 
deficiency in implementation [of Chinese law]” make it difficult to assess the 
practical status of the law governing CSR.41  Furthermore, the Chinese 
government frequently uses temporary trials to test new legislation, making it 
difficult to gauge the long-term effectiveness of CSR initiatives that are only 
implemented on a short-term basis.42 
China’s previous Company Law, enacted in 1994, was less explicit in its 
recognition of CSR.43  The fact that contemporary CSR doctrine was not then 
fully conceptualized in China partially contributes to the omission of clear 
language endorsing corporate social responsibility principles.44  Still, it is 
unnecessary to read the law liberally in order to discern the underlying CSR 
principles; for example, the textual basis for CSR in the 1994 Company Law 
comes from Article 14, which provided that “[c]ompanies must comply with 
the law, conform to business ethics, strengthen the construction of the 
socialist civilization, and subject themselves to the government and public 
supervision in the course of business.”45  However, values now considered 
central to CSR, specifically consideration for stakeholders such as 
employees, were “institutionalized into the corporate governance structure” 
by the 1994 Company Law.46 
Other legislative actions in China have contributed to the institutional 
adoption of corporate social responsibility in the country.  The Harmonious 
Society Policy, proposed by President Hu Jintao and adopted by the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, has serious implications for 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.; see also Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2011 Special 301 Report 
19–21 (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-publication 
s/2011/2011-special-301-report (discussing China’s 2010 Special Campaign to Combat 
Intellectual Property Infringement).  
 43 Lin, supra note 26, at 68 (“The 1994 Company Law did not explicitly refer to 
CSR. . . .”). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 69. 
 46 Id. at 68. 
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corporate social responsibility.47  Specifically, CSR policies are seen as a 
broad approach to Chinese governance, which promote the ruling party’s 
goals with respect to the economy, social stability, and environmental 
protection.48  In a more general sense, the Harmonious Society Policy adopts 
the principles of CSR in an effort to promote desired social outcomes—
namely, “[closing] the gap between rural and urban development, unequal 
income distribution, insufficiency of household wealth, ecological 
degradation and lack of efficient use of resources.”49 
2.  The Chinese Constitution 
In addition to legislation adopting CSR, the basic principles enshrined in 
the Chinese constitution tacitly approve CSR.50  At its formation, the 
document was intended to promote the rights of workers and guarantee social 
benefits.51  Amendments in recent years have even backtracked slightly on 
China’s typical aversion to addressing human rights and have begun to 
protect certain human rights in the Chinese constitution.52  While many of 
China’s major corporations are still state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
controlled by the government (nearly a quarter of corporate assets are state-
                                                                                                                   
 47 Sixth General Meeting of the Sixteenth Central Commission of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Ruogan Zhongda 
Wenti de Jueding [Several Important Resolutions on the Construction of Socialist Harmonious 
Society by the Central Commission of the Chinese Communist Party], Oct. 11, 2006, 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/content_5218639.htm; see also 
China Publishes Resolution on Building of Harmonious Society, XINHUA, Oct. 18, 2006, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/18/content_5219111.htm; Maureen Fan, China’s 
Party Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society’ Doctrine Proposed By 
President Hu Formally Endorsed, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18. 
 48 Brohier-Meuter, supra note 34, at 70. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See XIANFA (1982) (China). 
 51 Id. art. 1; see also Lin, supra note 26, at 68 (“The Constitution of the People’s Republic 
of China states that the country is led by the proletariat and is based on the alliance of workers 
and peasants.”). 
 52 See Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 180, 193 (2003) (quoting the Chief Justice of the Chinese Supreme Court: 
“[T]he Constitution is the expression of the people’s power and the citizens’ rights.”).  
However, these new guarantees of freedom have negligible practical effects because the 
protections are not enforced by the Chinese legislature or judiciary organs and in fact are 
effectively destroyed through other government activities.  See, e.g., Jianlan Zhu, Roadblock 
and Roadmap: Circumventing Press Censorship in China in the New Media Dimension, 30 U. 
LA VERNE L. REV. 404, 406 (2009) (discussing the contradiction between the Chinese 
constitution guaranteeing freedom of the press and low level press regulations). 
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owned),53 the constitution does now recognize and approve the existence of 
private sectors of the economy.54  Thus, the general underlying principles of 
the Chinese constitution seem to implicitly further some of the same goals 
incorporated by corporate social responsibility. 
3.  Other Enactments and Methods of Implementation 
A multitude of other laws and regulatory enactments have been adopted 
to implement corporate social responsibility, including the Labour Contract 
Law, the Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, and the 
Measures on Open Environmental Information.55  Such initiatives are 
consistent with the defining characteristic of Chinese CSR efforts: top-down 
planning that incorporates a diverse array of regulatory methods.56  The 
Chinese government primarily exercises power over CSR development 
through “(1) Company law including CSR; (2) CSR guidelines—even if 
these guidelines do not have the status of law, we can assume that they have 
regulatory power; [and] (3) [e]nvironmental requirements for credit and 
listing in stock exchange.”57  Other methods include quasi-judicial CSR 
Guidelines disseminated by public actors58 and policy statements 
encouraging traditional components of CSR, such as sustainable 
development, issued by the Chinese government.59  Examples of the 
aforementioned methods of CSR-regulation in China are numerous.60  Actors 
releasing CSR legislation, recommendations, guidelines, and regulations 
include the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of the State Council (SASAC), the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of 
Commerce, the State Forestry Administration, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC), the Ministry of Environmental Protection, stock 
exchanges, and provincial and municipal governments.61  These public actors 
have instituted everything from reporting requirements to the China Charity 
                                                                                                                   
 53 NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, COMMUNIQUE ON MAJOR DATA OF THE SECOND 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC CENSUS (NO. 1) (2009), http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcoming 
events/t20091225_402610168.htm (stating that of 186,300 billion Yuan in corporate assets, 
47,700 billion Yuan are state-owned). 
 54 XIANFA art. 11 (amended 2004) (“The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the 
non-public sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the 
economy.”). 
 55 Brohier-Meuter, supra note 34, at 75. 
 56 Id. at 76. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 84. 
 59 Lin, supra note 26, at 88. 
 60 See Brohier-Meuter, supra note 34, tbl.4.6 (listing public CSR initiatives in China). 
 61 Id.  
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Awards, which present awards to both local and overseas enterprises for their 
financial donations.62 
B.  Scope, Limits, and Enforcement 
While Chinese corporate social responsibility efforts have undergone an 
incredible expansion in recent years, some sectors are still neglected.  For 
example, China still tends to exclude human rights from its conception of 
CSR and instead focuses on environmental and labor issues.63  Traditionally, 
the Chinese government dominated CSR and severely limited the role of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).64  Thus, only recently have NGOs 
begun to impact CSR in China. 
China has taken a strong-handed approach to enforcement of its CSR 
initiatives.  Violations of CSR mandates can result in fines, prison sentences, 
and even execution of responsible corporate officers.65  Such harsh penalties 
may or may not be effective, however, because enforcement is often uneven 
and there are discrepancies “between the law on the books and the law in 
practice,” with many of the mandatory CSR initiatives going largely 
unenforced.66  
C.  Societal Basis 
1.  Socio-Historic Basis 
Chinese corporate social responsibility is strongly influenced by the 
historical role of state-owned enterprises as providers of “cradle-to-grave” 
social services and programs instituted by the socialist government.67  The 
evolution of the Chinese Company Law has struggled to synthesize a more 
capitalistic model where the goal is maximizing profits while simultaneously 
retaining a sense of corporate responsibility towards workers and 
unrepresented parties affected by a corporation’s decisions.68  Corporate 
social responsibility is a partial solution to the systemic transition problems 
                                                                                                                   
 62 Id. at 77. 
 63 Id. at 77–80. 
 64 Id. at 90. 
 65 Id. at 81. 
 66 Lin, supra note 26, at 96. 
 67 Xinting Jia, Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Past, 
Present, and Future, 17 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 136 (2004). 
 68 Id.; see also Lin, supra note 26, at 90–91. 
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facing the Chinese government and its SOEs.69  Certain CSR initiatives, 
particularly those that benefit employees, may help reduce worker unrest as 
traditional social programs administering benefits to workers are 
discontinued by SOEs.70 
2.  Religious-Philosophical Basis 
The philosophical underpinnings of Chinese society complement the 
values of corporate social responsibility, providing a strong societal 
foundation for CSR in China.  Two primary Chinese traditions relate to CSR.  
First, in traditional Chinese culture, which is heavily influenced by 
Confucianism, profit-seeking is spurned in favor of the company’s “inherent 
social responsibilities.”71  Historically, business entities run by extended 
families were viewed as “an organic part of the larger community” with 
responsibilities toward stakeholders in the community as well as the entire 
country.72  Thus, Confucian philosophy’s hostility toward profit-making 
complements Chinese societal understanding of corporate social 
responsibility.73 
Second, the Buddhist tradition in China has many parallels with corporate 
social responsibility.  For example, Zen philosophy tends to encourage 
“values, norms and rules that shape the responsible business behaviour.”74 
[T]he East and South has been more content with inner-
directed, intangible CSR (deeply rooted in cultural, tribal or 
religious traditions of community, respect and reciprocity).  
Examples include . . . the Chinese notion of xiaokang 
(‘harmonious society’).   
 The Zen of CSR also suggests that CSR has transformative 
power–that both companies and individuals can be changed by 
                                                                                                                   
 69 Jia, supra note 67 (“[S]ince China is still in its transition period of economic reform, it is 
inevitable that former [CSR-esque worker support programs] will . . . provide a stable 
environment for economic development.”). 
 70 Lin, supra note 26, at 88. 
 71 Id. at 85. 
 72 Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and 
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (2000). 
 73 Id. at 1607 (“The main problem for Chinese business enterprises was the anti-mercantile 
attitude of orthodox Confucianism and its general ideological hostility to profit-seeking.”). 
 74 Wayne Visser, Zen, in THE A TO Z OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 501, 501 
(Wayne Visser et al. eds., 2007). 
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engaging with CSR, which points to . . . CSR as a form of self-
transcendence.75 
Additionally, scholarly studies of the influence of major world religions on 
business ethics have also noted a correlation between Buddhism and socially 
responsible corporate practices.76  Some scholars view CSR as a material 
aspect of Buddhism: “[I]n the economic field many Buddhist teachers argue 
that detachment from the purely material and a focus on social and 
environmental responsibility in production, distribution and exchange are 
consistent with and indeed central to the proper practice of the faith.”77  
Particular aspects of CSR, especially environmental protection efforts, are 
very closely associated with Buddhist values, which “stem from the 
recognition of mutual interdependence of all things and the desire to avoid 
doing harm to any living thing.”78  More generally, Buddhists express “a 
clear preference for ethical business behaviour compared to non-believers.”79  
Thus, closely held Chinese philosophy and religious traditions provide a 
solid foundation in Chinese society for the adoption of corporate social 
responsibility. 
Finally, various socio-political issues have encouraged the development 
of CSR.  Perhaps because SOEs were unaccustomed to authentic public 
accountability, responsible corporate behavior did not develop naturally 
among Chinese companies as the Chinese economy moved toward a market 
system where profit-making was encouraged.80  In recent years, current 
events, such as the tainted infant formula scandal,81 caused popular outrage 
and emboldened Chinese citizens to insist on increasing corporate 
accountability and social responsibility.82  Failure to address perceived 
                                                                                                                   
 75 Id. at 502. 
 76 Stephen Brammer et al., Religion and Attitudes to Corporate Social Responsibility in a 
Large Cross-Country Sample, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 229 (2006). 
 77 Id. at 232. 
 78 Id. at 233. 
 79 Id. at 235. 
 80 See Lin, supra note 26, at 90 (noting that some scholars posit that the sense of corporate 
irresponsibility embodied by some Chinese companies stems from “the political ambience in 
the initial stage of economic development”). 
 81 Ying Chen, Corporate Social Responsibility from the Chinese Perspective, 21 IND. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 419, 419 (2011). 
 82 See Jim Yardley, Chinese Baby Formula Scandal Widens as 2nd Death is Announced, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A6 (pointing out how, since the formula scandal, Chinese 
regulators have become more determined to crack down on company cover-ups and failures to 
announce defects in a timely manner). 
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environmental and economic shortcomings has prompted indignation among 
Chinese citizens dissatisfied with insufficient CSR practices.83   
Other factors, such as poor working conditions and inadequate CSR-
influenced labor laws, also contribute to social ire.84  Additionally, 
marginalization of underrepresented groups and the Communist Party’s 
focus on “boosting public ‘happiness’ rather than just GDP” has contributed 
to a stronger push towards implementation of effective CSR measures.85   
Placing a strong emphasis on social harmony is particularly imperative 
for Chinese officials because “[g]ood performance in improving living 
quality of the Chinese population is believed to be the most important pillar 
of the [Chinese Communist Party’s] political legitimacy.”86  Propaganda is 
regularly distributed in an effort to publicize and praise the Communist 
Party’s supposed successes in improving social conditions and welfare.87  
Successful implementation of corporate social responsibility policies that 
promote social harmony and stability is therefore a key objective of the 
Chinese government.  Absent a successful transition to a market economy—
wherein the expected social programs historically administered by SOEs are 
protected and the worker’s influence as stakeholder is preserved—the 
Communist Party could potentially face intense scrutiny, in turn undermining 
its presently unchallenged rule.88  Thus, corporate social responsibility in 
China is rightfully characterized as a mechanism for social and political 
stability in an evolving economic system. 
                                                                                                                   
 83 Lin, supra note 26, at 91. 
 84 Id. at 92 (“Chinese workers have voiced their anger through their exodus from 
sweatshops.”). 
 85 Rising Power, Anxious State, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2011, at 3, 18. 
 86 Lin, supra note 26, at 93; see also JOSEPH FEWSMITH, CHINA SINCE TIANANMEN: THE 
POLITICS OF TRANSITION 9 (William Kirby ed., 2001) (noting the huge reform shift “from class 
struggle to economic modernization,” and the importance of performance legitimacy and the 
ways in which the Chinese political system can respond). 
 87 See, e.g., Ma Zuyun, Communist Party of China as [sic] Earned Right to Lead, PEOPLE’S 
DAILY, June 23, 2011, available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/74189 
38.html (praising the Communist Party’s success in adapting to fluctuating world conditions 
and remaining a leader of China’s revolution); Zhong Jia, CPC Makes People Proud, 
PEOPLE’S DAILY, June 24, 2011, available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/7420 
264.html (attributing Communist Party’s ability to “save” China to always remembering its 
Chinese roots); and Li Xiaosan, Chinese Can Derive Strength from Party History, PEOPLE’S 
DAILY, June 24, 2011, available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/7419275.html 
(stating the history of the Communist Party is congruent with “the inspired history of the 
Chinese revolution, the unyielding history of Chinese construction, and the magnificent 
history of Chinese reform”). 
 88 See Jia, supra note 67 (describing China’s gradual corporate change); see also Lin, supra 
note 26, at 88 (“How to properly settle the . . . employees without causing social unrest has 
been an important question.  In the transitional period, balancing the interests of stakeholders 
in the SOEs is an important task, which therefore echoes some aspects of CSR.”). 
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IV.  CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Legislative Action 
1.  Model Codes and State Legislation 
Corporate social responsibility initiatives in the United States have been 
codified selectively, although the level of government that addresses CSR 
tends to have implications on how explicitly CSR principles are expressed.  
Model codes, state law, and federal statutes each take a different approach to 
the codification of CSR. 
At the bottom of the statutory hierarchy, model codes take a moderate 
approach in implementing CSR.  For example, the American Law Institute 
(ALI) expresses a permissive view towards CSR in its Principles of 
Corporate Governance.89  Under the ALI model statute, corporate directors 
are allowed to make decisions with ethical or humanitarian purposes in mind 
and may “devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare and 
philanthropic purposes, even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not 
enhanced.”90  Such actions are neither banned nor mandated.91   
States largely take a similar approach as the Principles of Corporate 
Governance.92  Simply put, state “[c]orporate law neither statutorily imposes 
a duty to maximize profits nor mandates profit maximization as the sole 
purpose of the corporation.”93  In Pennsylvania, for example, corporate 
directors are permitted to “consider . . . [t]he effects of any action upon any 
or all groups affected by such action, including shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon communities 
in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located.”94  
Pennsylvania’s statute represents the permissive approach because it gives 
directors the freedom to make unprofitable decisions, thus preserving the 
fundamental principle of corporate law, the business judgment rule.95   
                                                                                                                   
 89 See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (1992) (allowing a corporation’s objective 
to focus on profit). 
 90 Choudhury, supra note 17, at 643. 
 91 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, supra note 89. 
 92 See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (2012) (giving deference to management). 
 93 Choudhury, supra note 17, at 640. 
 94 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (2012). 
 95 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
733, 738 (2005) (“Corporate managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize 
corporate profits.  Rather, they have always had some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to 
sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest . . . . [T]he implicit version of this discretion 
could not be eliminated without destroying the business judgment rule that is the bedrock of 
corporate law.”). 
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Delaware case law also reflects this permissive approach.96  The 
permissive statutory approach, giving directors the discretion to make 
business decisions in the interests of corporate social responsibility rather 
than in the pursuit of profits, is firmly established in the United States.  No 
state places the onus of pure profit-maximization on directors, but all have 
enacted statutes allowing directors to make “unprofitable corporate 
donations.”97 
Equitable rules also play a role in CSR implementation.98  For example, 
Professor Adolf Berle suggested what would effectively be a broad 
expansion of the fiduciary duty of directors enforced by courts of equity.99  
This approach characterized directors as holding the assets of the corporation 
in trust for the shareholders.100  Unlike typical legislative or regulatory 
approaches, Professor Berle’s theory envisions that the activities of directors 
would be subject to review by courts of equity which would “impose strict 
duties on corporate managers.”101  Despite Professor Berle’s influence on the 
debate over CSR, his theory in Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust has 
gained little traction and is not widely accepted.102 
2.  Federal Forays into CSR 
Corporate social responsibility was initially seen as a state matter, and 
states traditionally have had jurisdiction over business and commercial law.  
In the twenty-first century however, the federal government has not been 
silent with regards to CSR legislation and policy.103  Historically, states were 
tasked with authority over corporate governance and the federal government 
maintained power to regulate securities,104 but “the relative powers of the 
                                                                                                                   
 96 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990); 
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (construing 
Delaware law “to authorize any reasonable corporate gift of a charitable or educational 
nature”). 
 97 Elhauge, supra note 95, at 738. 
 98 Wells, supra note 10, at 89. 
 99 Id. at 88–89. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 90. 
 102 Id. at 90–91. 
 103 Peter V. Letsou, The Changing Face of Corporate Governance Regulation in the United 
States: The Evolving Roles of the Federal and State Governments, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
149, 150, 167 (2009). 
 104 Id. at 167–76 (describing the creation of federal power to regulate securities through the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and creation of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission). 
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federal government and the states have shifted over the last seventy-five 
years, particularly in response to corporate crises and scandals.”105   
For example, Congress tentatively approached federal CSR legislation in 
the wake of the Enron scandal when skepticism toward corporate actors 
reached a fever pitch.106  One interpretation of the fall of Enron theorizes that 
“Enron’s business model exemplifies the pathology of the ‘shareholder 
value’ system . . . . The company’s focus on short-term stock price 
appreciation, in part the result of the share options granted to senior 
management, was the cause of its downfall.”107  In other words, the profit-
maximization model, which Enron took to the extreme, encourages 
irresponsible decision-making and causes companies to make short-term 
decisions with negative long-term consequences.108  The solution, according 
to some scholars, is to return discretion to directors who can then take both 
short-term profit and long-term corporate well-being and responsibility into 
account.109   
In response to the collapse of Enron and a series of related corporate 
scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which sought to preclude 
Enron-style events from occurring in the future.110  Although Sarbanes-Oxley 
                                                                                                                   
 105 Id. at 176. 
 106 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (2002); see also Five Years Under the 
Thumb: Corporate America Is Learning How to Live with the Tough Regulations Introduced 
After the Collapse of Enron, ECONOMIST, July 26, 2007, available at http://www.economist. 
com/node/9545905?story_id=9545905 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, widely known as SOX, 
was signed into law on July 30th 2002 by George Bush, who called its tough new rules the 
‘most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since Franklin Roosevelt was 
president’.  The hope was to restore public confidence in American business, which had been 
badly shaken by huge corporate scandals, such as those which led to the bankruptcies of 
Enron and WorldCom.”). 
 107 Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Corporate Governance after Enron: An Age of 
Enlightenment?, in AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING 
SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE US 156 (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery 
eds., 2006). 
 108 Id.; see also Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Story of Pinocchio: Now I’m a Real Boy, 45 B.C. 
L. REV. 829, 844 (2004) (“[C]orporate managers engaged in behavior that resulted in a 
deceptive portrayal of the corporation’s financial state.  The behavior presumably was 
motivated by the actors’ belief that this portrayal would positively affect the market worth of 
the corporation in question . . . .”). 
 109 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (“The only effective 
antidotes to fraud are active and vigilant markets and professionals with strong incentives to 
investigate corporate managers and dig up corporate information.”). 
 110 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (2002); Thomas Schneck, The Duty to 
Search, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 703 (2005) (stating that “[i]n response to 
professional studied ignorance, as well as even more serious issues brought to light in Enron 
and Worldcom, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires higher 
standards of professional responsibility for lawyers practicing before the SEC, as well as 
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is not explicit CSR legislation, the Act’s underlying rationale correlates 
strongly with corporate social responsibility.111  In fact, some scholars 
recognized the opportunity Sarbanes-Oxley created to incorporate CSR into 
federal law:  
As we contemplate the integrity of corporate accounting 
statements [explicitly addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley], we can 
continue to contemplate the fairness of corporate 
actions. . . . [I]t may appear that strategies for assuring that 
corporate managers neither lie about nor steal corporate assets 
also are helpful in preserving the environment, improving the 
lives of workers, and enhancing product quality.112 
Federal securities laws, which preceded Sarbanes-Oxley, are another area of 
federal regulation of corporate behavior.113  Actions taken by the Securities 
Exchange Commission, including the promulgation of the Shareholder 
Proposal Rule and insider trading restrictions, along with Congressional acts 
such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are examples of federal forays into 
corporate governance and practices.114  Again, while these laws do not 
explicitly mandate CSR, they do lay a foundation for more federal 
involvement in the CSR behavior of corporations.115 
B.  Scope and Enforcement 
Corporate social responsibility in the United States incorporates a number 
of diverse interests.116  The activities involved in CSR historically were “seen 
as mainly ‘donations to social and artistic causes and other such acts of 
corporate philanthropy.’ ”117  In relation to those affected by the corporation, 
                                                                                                                   
requiring officers of public corporations to personally certify the accuracy of certain 
documents submitted to the SEC upon which third parties customarily rely”). 
 111 See Ribstein, supra note 109, at 11–18 (discussing key reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
similar regulations that attempt to allow the federal government to indirectly regulate 
corporate governance). 
 112 Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 830. 
 113 Id. at 841. 
 114 Letsou, supra note 103, at 179–91. 
 115 See id. (noting that although Congress and the SEC have taken steps at the federal level 
to encourage or mandate changes in corporate governance practices, these steps tend to be 
“more modest reforms, rather than wholesale displacements of state corporate law”). 
 116 Backer, supra note 32. 
 117 Pitts, supra note 11, at 389 (quoting Abid Aslam, Backgrounder: Corporate Social 
Responsibility, INITIATIVE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE (2007), http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/ 
j_corporatesocial.html). 
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CSR in the United States also seeks to define the “duties large business 
organizations might have to their workers, customers, neighbors, and the 
public at large.”118  Ultimately, American CSR attempts to motivate 
“corporate managers and directors to take into account the needs not only of 
shareholders but of workers, consumers, and communities when making 
business decisions.”119 
C.  Social Basis 
The social basis for CSR in the United States is broad and diverse.  From 
a moral-humanist perspective, corporations often use cooperation with CSR 
policies to appear virtuous and to relate to their communities.120  However, 
some religious groups—particularly those of the Abrahamic tradition—tend 
to view socially responsible corporate behavior as a tenet of their faith.121  
Codes of conduct promulgated by religious groups promote values common 
to CSR, such as justice, mutual respect, stewardship, and honesty.122 
Historical factors may also contribute to the social acceptance of 
corporate social responsibility.  For instance, some scholars posit that CSR 
developed as a response to the perceived irresponsibility of corporations in 
the years preceding the Great Depression.123  Others suggest later social 
movements contributed more to the adoption of CSR.124 
Socio-political traditions in the United States may also explain an affinity 
towards CSR doctrine.125  In the United States, businesses have typically 
been given the freedom to engage in economic activity subject to the 
                                                                                                                   
 118 Wells, supra note 10, at 77. 
 119 Id. at 79. 
 120 Colin Marks & Paul S. Miller, Plato, The Prince, and Corporate Virtue: Philosophical 
Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 121 See, e.g., AN INTERFAITH DECLARATION: A CODE OF ETHICS ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
FOR CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND JEWS (Nov. 30, 1992), available at http://institute.jesdialogue. 
org/fileadmin/bizcourse/INTERFAITHDECLARATION.pdf (stating that a dialogue between 
a group of Christian, Jewish and Muslim thinkers and business leaders led to the drafting of a 
Declaration of International Business Ethics which focused on supplanting the emerging value 
system of dishonesty and selfishness with one of integrity and generosity). 
 122 Kelly Lavelle, Interfaith Declaration: A Code of Ethics on International Business for 
Christians, Muslims and Jews, in THE A TO Z OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 279, 280 
(Wayne Visser et al. eds., 2007). 
 123 See Wells, supra note 10, for a more comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the 
Berle-Means debate during the Depression Era. 
 124 FREEMAN & GILBERT, supra note 24, at 88 (“Rooted in the post-World War II social 
environment, particularly the social movements in the 1960’s, models of corporate social 
responsibility were developed to enable managers to understand the societal obligations 
incurred by their firms.”). 
 125 Id. 
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government’s supervision and oversight.126  Professor Freeman observed 
that, “[t]he business-government relationship in the U.S. has been founded 
on the principles of the ‘watch-dog,’ i.e., it is the legitimate role of 
government to regulate business in the public interest, and to enforce strict 
anti-trust laws to insure adherence to market principles.”127  Such an attitude 
is consistent with CSR’s blend of corporate and political action.   
V.  COMPARING THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN APPROACHES 
There are multiple points of comparison and contrast between CSR in the 
United States and CSR in China.  One of the obvious differences between the 
two approaches is the federal nature of CSR legislation.  In China, as 
previously discussed, the governing Company Law is a law of nationwide 
impact, enacted and enforced by the national government of the People’s 
Republic of China.128  In contrast, the federal government in the United 
States has been less active in regulating corporate activity in this country.129 
Such nationwide legislation in China is arguably more enforceable, at 
least on a statutory basis, than legislation implemented by individual U.S. 
states.  Whereas China’s Company Law sets forth unambiguous and 
mandatory language implementing CSR, state statutes in the U.S. generally 
take a permissive approach and do not contain affirmative language similar 
to the Chinese statute.130  This may be due to the fact that China has taken a 
top-down approach to CSR implementation, which fits naturally with its 
communist scheme of governance.  The United States, on the other hand, has 
likewise taken the approach natural to its federalist bottom-up government: 
selective state implementation followed by federal encroachment on 
corporate social responsibility issues. 
The obvious conclusion—that textual differences in the respective 
statutes mean China’s statute is better implemented, must be taken with a 
caveat.  In practice, it is unlikely the Chinese statute allows for more 
effective enforcement of CSR than U.S. statutes do because of the general 
ambiguity and uneven enforcement that plagues Chinese law.  Thus, neither 
country has truly established a mechanism to effectively mandate, enforce, 
and oversee the implementation of corporate social responsibility. 
                                                                                                                   
 126 FREEMAN, supra note 23, at 13. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Chinese Company Law, supra note 33. 
 129 Wells, supra note 10, at 118–23 (discussing how failure of federal chartering means state 
law primarily governs corporations). 
 130 Compare Chinese Company Law, supra note 33, with 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (2012). 
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Another difference between CSR in the U.S. and China is the motivation 
behind its propagation.  In the United States, CSR is seen as a moral 
obligation of companies, properly overseen by the government, which 
improves the relationship between the corporation and individuals.  On the 
other hand, CSR in China is a means to an end—namely the maintenance of 
the regime’s political stability and firm hold on power in China.  The 
contrasting motives the United States and China have for adopting CSR may 
be partially explained by the countries’ different sources of political 
legitimacy—representative government in the United States and communist 
government in China—but this topic is outside the scope of this Note. 
On a related note, Chinese CSR has focused more on corporate social 
responsibility initiatives that further ideals acceptable to the Communist 
Party of China.  Often, these include environmental objectives and more 
protective labor standards rather than protection for human rights or civil 
liberties.131  Unlike China, which limits the scope of CSR, corporate social 
responsibility in the United States is much broader and more inclusive of 
everything from traditional charitable giving to ensuring corporations 
comply with established human rights standards in the pursuit of profit.132  It 
is difficult to say which approach is more objectively effective because there 
are numerous methods of measuring the effectiveness of CSR.133 
The underlying commonality between the respective approaches of China 
and the United States is the apparent presumption that the government 
necessarily must become involved in the development and implementation of 
CSR initiatives.  Admittedly, both have taken slightly different approaches 
and have enacted different gradations of CSR at various levels of 
government.  Fundamentally, though, both still rely on government 
regulations to compel positive behavior by corporations. 
VI.  THE FUTURE OF CSR 
A.  Proposals Suggesting Further Government Intervention 
A number of proposals support increased government involvement in 
CSR and corporate conscience activities and regulations.  Government 
regulation is seen as a necessary solution to the perceived problems of 
                                                                                                                   
 131 Lin, supra note 26, at 74–75. 
 132 Pitts, supra note 11, at 337–39. 
 133 Different methods of measuring CSR include public opinion regarding corporations, the 
absolute value of donations and corporate giving, and the percentage of corporate earnings 
directed towards charity.  It is even more difficult to measure the value of non-monetary gifts. 
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corporate indifference or unwillingness to engage in socially responsible 
activity.134 
1.  Corporate Conscience Committees 
The first major proposal is the government-mandated establishment of 
corporate conscience committees.135  According to proponents, conscience 
committees would be given the task of ensuring the corporation was 
undertaking appropriate CSR initiatives; such efforts are quaintly 
characterized as a corporate Jiminy Cricket.136 
This proposal has several insurmountable obstacles.  Most fundamentally, 
the creation of corporate conscience committees would do little more than 
provide additional procedures for corporations to comply with while failing 
to ensure an objectively effective outcome.137  The inherently advisory nature 
of conscience committees would place the duty to produce recommendations 
on a few, while removing responsibility from other entities within the 
corporation who logically should share the burden of implementing social 
responsibility.138  From an “outsider” perspective, such “[a] proposal that 
does no more than ritually invoke the services of the same group of middle-
aged white male and white male wannabes is . . . apt to fall prey to the 
criticism that it is a counterproductive standard operating procedure,” and 
fails to take into account diverse perspectives on social responsibility.139  
Finally, it is unclear how the government would oversee the establishment of 
conscience committees.140 
2.  Stringent SEC Monitoring 
A related proposal suggests additional monitoring and disclosure 
requirements by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).141  
Proponents argue that the SEC has the authority to “require disclosure of 
socially relevant, but non-material, information,” and presupposes that 
                                                                                                                   
 134 Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 829–34 (noting “the intervention of conscience is 
necessary” and detailing several government-initiated proposals). 
 135 Id. at 863. 
 136 Id. at 858–59. 
 137 Id. at 859. 
 138 Id. at 861. 
 139 Id. at 864. 
 140 Id. at 863–64. 
 141 Wells, supra note 10, at 134–35. 
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forcing companies to disclose their activities will cause them to engage in 
more CSR behavior.142 
Increased disclosure mandated by the SEC, however, suffers from the 
same process-related problems of the preceding proposals.  Simply ordering 
companies to disclose their inner-workings will not necessarily incentivize 
them to engage in CSR; but even supposing it did, disclosure requirements 
give negligible direction toward the types of programs proponents assume 
will be adopted.143 
3.  Criminal Penalties 
The third proposal, which addresses the enforcement shortcomings 
inherent in the abovementioned proposals, would resort to an alternative 
method of government regulation: criminal enforcement for corporate 
indifference.144  Such a penal approach would undoubtedly increase the 
incentive for corporate officers and directors to engage in more socially 
responsible behavior.145  Unlike the proposals grounded in process, however, 
it could also result in corporate flight to jurisdictions that do not have 
criminal enforcement for failure to implement CSR.146  Criminalizing the 
failure to act also dredges up the controversial and long-standing debate over 
the legal liability for nonfeasance or omissions rather than malfeasance or 
positive wrong-doing.147  Finally, the potential for criminal liability 
complicates the relationship between the corporation and its managers as the 
parties seek to manage risk.148 
Another potential drawback is the tendency of government enforcement 
mechanisms to become even more draconian.149  Faced with avoidance or 
                                                                                                                   
 142 Id.  For a detailed discussion of the SEC’s ability to implement CSR-type disclosure 
requirements, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999). 
 143 Wells, supra note 10, at 136. 
 144 Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 864. 
 145 Id. at 867. 
 146 Id.  
 147 See Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An 
Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 386–87 
(1998) (noting criminal enforcement of omissions is a “controversial and an emotional issue” 
that has been debated for almost a century). 
 148 See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Politics and Corporate Crime Legislation, REGULATION, 
Spring 2004, at 33, available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulatio 
n/2004/4/v27n1-3.pdf (observing the difficulties companies face in trying to indemnify 
potential high-level employees against criminal liability, in contrast to the ease of 
indemnification for civil liability). 
 149 See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, A Closer Look at the Federalization Snowball, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 73 (2009). 
770  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:747 
 
 
noncompliance, government regulation must become even more adept at 
delving into the inner workings of corporations and overseeing minute 
operating details to ensure compliance with CSR policies and regulations.  
The backlash against such measures is demonstrated by business leaders’ 
dissatisfaction with the oversight provisions contained in Sarbanes-Oxley.150  
While businesses must operate under the rule of law, eventually regulations 
become so onerous to business that the enforcement costs outweigh any 
positive aspects.151  Obviously, corporations should be punished by law for 
engaging in fraud or other illegal activities.  At some point however, 
business decisions must be left to management without the presence of a 
government regulator supervising their every move. 
Proposals recommending increased government involvement in CSR 
issues have fatal flaws that cannot be overcome due to the aforementioned 
inherent enforcement problems and dilemmas regarding government 
oversight and deference to the business judgment of the corporation’s 
leadership.  A model that is independent of ineffective government 
regulation—but still promotes the positive goals of CSR—is therefore 
needed. 
B.  The Feasible Solution: Corporate-Led CSR 
The most effective model for the future of CSR is a corporation-led, 
market-oriented, consumer-driven corporate social responsibility doctrine.  
This proposal does not suffer from the same weaknesses of government-
initiative proposals; in fact, its strengths mirror the weaknesses of the other 
proposals.  One author sums up the argument this way: 
 Ironically, businesses are probably the best solution that we 
can have to the challenges that face us as a society, because 
they are the ones that can innovate, can produce solutions, and 
can be part of the engine of development that will eventually 
bring developing countries out of poverty that may, just may, 
have a whisker of a chance of achieving sustainability.152 
                                                                                                                   
 150 Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 854. 
 151 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Taken to the Cleaners: A Case Study of the Overregulation of 
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Indeed, corporations themselves, not governments, have the strongest 
incentive to create partnerships with their communities, cultivate good 
relations with stakeholders, and promote well-being because neglecting to do 
so will result in diminished revenue or even business failure.  Successful 
corporations, such as Starbucks, recognize this fact.153  For example, that 
company’s CEO, Howard Schultz, recently said, “We can’t wait for 
Washington.  Business leaders have to step up and do our part.”154  
Businesses and other private actors are capable of affecting appropriate CSR 
activities.155  Market forces provide the necessary incentive for corporations 
and private actors to essentially regulate themselves.156  Indeed, “[c]ivil 
regulation theory proposes that businesses are being regulated by civil 
society (rather than governments), through the dual effect of negative 
impacts from conflict and benefits from collaboration.”157  “[C]ivil society 
vigilance, consumer buying power, and socially responsible business 
leadership” are also contributing factors to a self-regulation model.158   
Other forces also contribute to and facilitate corporate social 
responsibility today.  For example, modern technology has made a private-
actor driven model technologically feasible because consumers and watch-
dog groups are increasingly able to access information about the corporations 
with which they interact.159 
The changing nature of corporate giving also dovetails with a 
corporation-centric, rather than government-centric, model of CSR.160  One 
Wal-Mart Foundation director recently said: “Gone are the days when people 
can just put money behind a good idea.  We want to support good ideas, but 
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good ideas that have an impact.”161  Corporations are simply in a better 
position to identify and engage in meeting the needs of local communities; 
legislation and regulations, particularly on the federal level, would be 
unwieldy and inefficient. 
There is some indication that in practice, CSR may in fact be moving 
naturally towards a corporation-initiated model: 
Starbucks isn’t alone in its quest [to launch job programs in 
local communities].  The traditional method of corporate 
giving, in which companies write checks to charities, is being 
replaced by efforts to work directly with communities and 
other constituents.  According to a recent report from the 
Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy, a CEO-
membership organization dedicated to increasing the level of 
corporate giving . . . there are long-term financial benefits to 
strengthening communities in which companies do business.162 
In sum, business leaders are increasingly aware of the symbiotic relationship 
between businesses and their communities—the financial well-being of each 
is promoted by the success of the other. 
Recent efforts by corporations such as Starbucks to change the way 
businesses engage in CSR activities is a step in the right direction because it 
recognizes that the most effective CSR programs are led by businesses with a 
holistic interest in their communities.  It also signifies a move away from 
criticism of CSR as mere “public relations” and renders the argument that 
CSR is simply a “window-dressing” irrelevant.163 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The corporate social responsibility movement began with good intentions.  
Indeed, its proponents seek the betterment of the individual and society.  
However, the increasing role of government in implementing CSR has 
hindered, rather than helped, the movement as a whole. 
While China’s recent trend toward implementation of CSR is certainly 
admirable, the federally mandated legislation and heavy regulation it has 
relied on to achieve its CSR goals have only increased bureaucracy.  In 
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reality, CSR in China has been ineffective thus far.  Neither has heavy-
handed implementation made Chinese CSR significantly more effective than 
CSR in the United States.  Corporate social responsibility in the U.S., on the 
other hand, has taken a tepid approach by granting statutory approval to CSR 
and skirting the edge of true CSR regulation without actually taking 
affirmative steps to implement it.  Neither the approach taken by China nor 
the United States approach captures the most effective model of CSR, 
because both rely on government action to achieve desired CSR outcomes.  
To the contrary, there is evidence that market forces, not government, have 
encouraged the development of CSR in China.  “Because they are required 
by their foreign partners to take responsibility for the social and 
environmental impacts of their business activities, Chinese companies are 
incentivized to develop CSR awareness.”164 
For the reasons discussed above, insurmountable enforcement problems 
doom government-mandated CSR.  Instead of continuing to tweak an 
unworkable government-led model, the United States and China should look 
to a corporation-led model that provides the proper incentives for 
corporations to protect the interests of their stakeholders through a market-
oriented system.  Although such a model might not have been feasible in 
years past, increasing consumer awareness and technology that can keep 
large corporations socially accountable is now readily available in the United 
States and rapidly spreading in China.  These advancements provide an 
effective framework for CSR today. 
Furthermore, the underlying principles of CSR already mesh well with 
the culture, history, and social philosophies of both China and the United 
States.  If there truly is popular and well-grounded social support for CSR 
practices, such behavior should develop naturally as corporations evolve. 
Support exists in the business community for corporate-led CSR that 
responds directly to the needs of individuals and communities without the 
inevitable delays and distortions caused by government regulation and 
process.  China and the United States need to adopt a corporate-led approach 
to CSR that will allow effective CSR measures to flourish. 
As world economic leaders, China and the United States have the 
opportunity to influence the rest of the world.  By letting companies develop 
CSR initiatives that best address the needs of individuals and communities, 
the underlying goals of corporate social responsibility—namely more 
satisfied consumers, better treatment for workers and the environment, and 
more socially engaged corporations—will be achieved. 
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A business-led model of corporate social responsibility is the only 
practicable model of CSR because it places incentives on the proper actors—
corporations—while eliminating the enforcement problems inherent in 
government legislation and regulations that are unevenly applied, as in 
China, or that lack teeth or any affirmative effect, as in the United States. 
The workable, corporate-driven model does not succumb to the 
enforcement problems of government regulation models, but rather surpasses 
them in actual effectiveness.  Traditional market forces, coupled with greater 
technological consumer oversight capabilities, make the corporate-led CSR 
model more feasible than ever before.  China should begin to repeal its 
legislation and regulations enforcing CSR and instead focus on improving 
transparency, and allow consumer awareness and involvement to continue to 
increase.  Likewise, the United States should scale back its more aggressive 
corporate social responsibility measures and allow businesses to make CSR 
decisions within the bounds of the law. 
 
